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ABSTRACT 
We investigate whether PCAOB inspections affect the quality of internal control audits. Our 
research design improves on prior studies by exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the content of PCAOB inspection reports, while also controlling for audit firm 
and year fixed effects, effectively achieving a difference-in-differences research design. We 
find that when PCAOB inspectors report higher rates of deficiencies in internal control 
audits, auditors respond by increasing the issuance of adverse internal control opinions. We 
also find that auditors issue more adverse internal control opinions to clients with concurrent 
misstatements, who thus genuinely warrant adverse opinions. We further find that higher 
inspection deficiency rates lead to higher audit fees, consistent with PCAOB inspections 
prompting auditors to undertake costly remediation efforts. Taken together, our results are 
consistent with the PCAOB inspections improving the quality of internal control audits by 
prompting auditors to remediate deficiencies in their audits of internal controls. 
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Do PCAOB Inspections Improve the Quality of Internal Control Audits? 
 
1. Introduction 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to provide oversight of public-company audits. Audit firm 
inspections are the PCAOB‟s core function and the primary tool given by Congress to enable 
the PCAOB to perform its oversight duties (PCAOB [2005]). The auditing profession, 
however, is harshly critical of the inspection program, claiming that it is largely ineffective 
(e.g., Johnson et al. [2015]). Further, the academic literature generally finds little evidence 
that inspections improve the quality of US audits. We investigate whether the PCAOB 
inspections improve the quality of internal control audits, a potential consequence of the 
inspection process not previously examined. Our research design improves on prior studies 
by exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series variation in the contents of PCAOB 
inspection reports, while controlling for audit firm and year fixed effects. This specification 
resembles a difference-in-differences estimation with a continuous treatment (e.g., Carpenter 
and Dobkin, 2011). 
Internal controls over financial reporting are critical in assuring high financial 
reporting quality, and auditors typically rely on clients‟ internal controls when auditing their 
financial statements. Recognizing the fundamental importance of internal controls, Section 
404 of SOX requires the independent audit of internal controls for all public companies with 
a public float exceeding $75 million (referred to as “accelerated filers”). We study a time 
period when the PCAOB increased its scrutiny of internal control audits in response to the 
SEC‟s concerns of a widespread decline in the quality of internal control audits. Specifically, 
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a downward trend in the frequency of adverse internal control opinions during 2005-2009 
prompted the SEC to speculate that auditors were systematically failing to identify and report 
material internal control weaknesses (SEC [2009]). These concerns were heightened by a 
concurrent upward trend in the issuance of clean internal control opinions to companies that 
materially misstated their financial reports, and thus should have received adverse opinions 
(Rice and Weber [2012]). The PCAOB responded in 2010 by directing its inspectors to put 
increased emphasis on assessing whether audit firms were obtaining sufficient evidence to 
support their internal control opinions. The purpose of our study is to test whether the 
PCAOB‟s increased inspection efforts were successful in improving the quality of internal 
control audits. 
Despite the PCAOB‟s increased efforts, there are several reasons why inspections 
may not improve audit quality. In interviews, auditing professionals assert that inspector-
identified deficiencies typically capture differences in professional judgment, rather than 
systematic audit failures; and argue that PCAOB inspectors lack the incentives and technical 
expertise to identify deficiencies that are likely to improve audit quality (Dowling, Knechel 
and Moroney [2015], Glover, Taylor and Wu [2015], Johnson et al. [2015]).1 Another 
impediment to the effectiveness of the PCAOB inspections is that the inspected engagements 
are not randomly chosen. If the identified deficiencies are unrepresentative, their remediation 
is unlikely to improve the firm-wide quality of internal control audits. In addition, audit firms 
may resist engaging in costly remediation because it is likely to increase audit fees and the 
issuance of adverse internal control opinions, both of which increase the risk of auditor 
dismissal (Ettredge et al. [2011], Newton et al. [2016], Johnson et al. [2015]).
 
The inability of 
the inspections to improve audit quality is also consistent with prior research finding little 
                                                          
1
 The PCAOB disagrees with assertions that inspector-identified deficiencies result from differences in 
professional judgment. PCAOB [2012a] states: “The PCAOB bases deficiency findings only on failures to 
obtain sufficient audit evidence, not on disagreements when reasonable judgments appear to have been made 
about such matters.” 
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evidence that adverse inspection reports trigger auditor switching among US clients (Johnson 
et al. [2015], Lennox and Pittman [2010]).
2
 
If the PCAOB‟s increased scrutiny successfully identifies systematic deficiencies in 
internal control audits, audit firms should have strong incentives to remediate the deficiencies 
in their auditing procedures. The PCAOB can impose tough penalties on errant audit firms, 
and critical inspection reports harm auditors‟ career prospects (Johnson et al. [2015]). If audit 
firms are successful in remediating the deficiencies identified in PCAOB inspections, it 
should lead to firm-wide improvements in their ability to identify material internal control 
weaknesses. Since auditors are required to issue adverse opinions to clients with material 
internal control weaknesses, this should lead to a firm-wide increase in the issuance of 
adverse internal control opinions. Thus, if the PCAOB‟s increased scrutiny of internal control 
audits is successful, we hypothesize that audit firms will respond to the audit deficiencies by 
increasing the issuance of adverse internal control opinions to their clients. 
We begin by documenting evidence supporting the SEC‟s assertion that the frequency 
of adverse internal control opinions declined during the period 2005-2009, and that this was 
accompanied by an upward trend in auditors issuing clean internal control opinions to 
companies with concurrent material misstatements (as revealed by subsequent restatements). 
Further, we document an increase in inspector-identified deficiencies in internal control 
audits during 2010-2013, consistent with the PCAOB‟s assertion that its inspectors began to 
intensify their focus on internal control audits beginning in 2010. We note, however, that our 
hypothesis does not assume that changes in audit quality explain these univariate time trends, 
as suggested by the SEC and PCAOB. Indeed, they could be explained by several other 
factors. For example, managers may have systematically failed to update and adapt their 
                                                          
2
 While there is little research that finds the PCAOB inspections, per se, improve audit quality, several studies 
find evidence of improved audit quality following the passage of SOX (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). For example, 
DeFond and Lennox (2011) find that SOX improved audit quality by motivating small low quality audit firms to 
exit the SEC market. 
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internal control systems in response to changes in the macro-economic environment, and/or 
new entrants and exits in the market could have changed the risk profile of accelerated filers. 
Because a variety of factors could influence the time trends in adverse internal control 
opinions as well as the deficiencies reported by the inspectors, we control for client 
characteristics, audit firm fixed effects, and year fixed effects in our multivariate tests.  
We test our hypothesis by examining auditors‟ internal control opinions for fiscal 
years 2010-2013, where 2010 marks the first inspection-year in which the PCAOB explicitly 
directed its inspectors to focus on assessing whether audit firms were obtaining sufficient 
evidence to support their internal control opinions, and to communicate any identified 
deficiencies in their inspection reports (Franzel [2014]). Further, 2010 is the first year in 
which the PCAOB inspection reports disclose the number of audit engagements examined in 
the inspections of audit firms with 100 or more clients. This is critical because the number of 
engagements is necessary for computing the audit firm‟s rate of internal control audit 
deficiencies, as reported by PCAOB inspectors, which is a central feature of our research 
design.  
Our primary analysis tests whether the audit firms‟ internal control “audit deficiency 
rates” predict their subsequent issuance of adverse internal control opinions. We compute the 
“audit deficiency rate” as the number of inspected engagements with identified internal 
control audit deficiencies, scaled by the total number of inspected engagements. We find that 
audit firms with higher deficiency rates subsequently issue more adverse internal control 
opinions. We further find that this increase is economically significant. Moving from the 25
th
 
to the 75
th
 percentile in the deficiency rate, the predicted probability of issuing an adverse 
internal control opinion nearly doubles -- from 2.1% to 3.9%. We also find that our results 
hold for both Big Four and non-Big Four auditors, and are resilient to a variety of robustness 
tests. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the PCAOB inspection reports 
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identifying systematic shortcomings in audit firms‟ procedures, and with the issuance of 
those inspection reports prompting auditors to remediate the shortcomings by increasing the 
rigor of their internal control audits.  
An alternative explanation for our findings is that auditors are attempting to appease 
the PCAOB simply by issuing more adverse opinions, irrespective of whether they are 
deserved. We address this issue in two ways. First, we observe that the objective of the 
inspections is to assess whether auditors gather sufficient audit evidence to support their 
internal control opinions. Thus, the inspections focus on assessing the audit process (i.e., the 
testing of internal controls), as opposed to the outcome of that process (i.e., the type of 
internal control opinion issued). This means that audit firms cannot avoid deficiencies in their 
inspection reports simply by issuing more adverse opinions, unless those opinions are 
supported by audit evidence. The inspectors‟ focus on evaluating the audit process, as 
opposed to the outcome of that process, is consistent with none of the inspection reports in 
our sample criticizing audit firms for failing to issue adverse opinions (i.e., the inspectors did 
not override the auditor‟s decision to issue a clean internal control opinion). It is also 
consistent with our finding that inspectors report failures to adequately test internal controls 
(17% of inspected engagements) more often than failures to assess the materiality of 
identified weaknesses (2% of inspected engagements). Moreover, both the testing and 
materiality deficiencies lead to increases in the issuance of adverse internal control opinions. 
This suggests that our results are driven by improvements in both internal control testing, and 
the auditor‟s evaluation of the materiality of detected weaknesses.  
Second, we test whether critical PCAOB inspection reports prompt auditors to issue 
adverse opinions to clients who warrant such opinions. If more adverse opinions are issued to 
clients who deserve them, those clients are also more likely to have concurrent 
misstatements, because misstatements can only occur in companies with material weaknesses 
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(Rice and Weber [2012]). As predicted, we find that audit firms with higher deficiency rates 
subsequently issue more adverse opinions to clients who concurrently misstate (as revealed 
by a subsequent restatement). This is consistent with PCAOB inspections prompting auditors 
to issue more adverse internal control opinions to clients who warrant them. Thus, the 
increase in adverse opinions reduces what are commonly referred to as “Type II” errors (i.e., 
failing to issue an adverse opinion to a company that misstates).
3
 
Another potential explanation is that audit firms attempt to appease the inspectors by 
issuing more adverse opinions in advance of the next inspection. We consider this unlikely 
because the inspection reports do not criticize auditors for failing to issue adverse opinions. 
Instead, the inspectors focus on deficiencies related to inadequate testing and evaluation of 
the materiality of identified control weaknesses (as discussed previously). Moreover, the 
auditor‟s internal control opinion does not influence the PCAOB‟s choice of which 
engagements to inspect (PCAOB [2009]). Consistent with this, we find that inspectors do not 
issue more favorable inspection reports to audit firms that issue more adverse internal control 
opinions in the period before the start of the inspection. Thus, while PCAOB inspection 
outcomes affect subsequent internal control opinions, internal control opinions do not affect 
subsequent PCAOB inspection outcomes.  
Finally, we find that audit fees increase significantly for the clients of audit firms that 
receive inspection reports that disclose higher internal control deficiency rates. Further, the 
increase is economically significant. As internal control deficiency rates increase from the 
25
th
 percentile (4.0%) to the 75
th
 percentile (27.3%), predicted audit fees increase by $63,000, 
equal to approximately 2% of mean audit fees. Finding an increase in firm-wide audit fees is 
consistent with audit firms responding to the deficiencies reported in the inspection reports 
                                                          
3
 We also note that what are commonly referred to as “Type I” errors (i.e., the issuance of an adverse opinion to a 
company that does not report a misstatement) are not reliable indicators of poor audit quality. This is because an 
adverse internal control opinion simply indicates the presence of a material weakness, and not all material 
weaknesses result in restatements. 
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by engaging in firm-wide remediation efforts to improve their internal control audit 
procedures across all of their clients, and corroborates the results of our main analysis. 
Our findings make several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature 
that examines whether PCAOB inspections improve audit quality. A few studies find that 
PCAOB inspections help to improve audit quality or the perceived quality of financial 
reporting (Carcello et al. [2011], Lamoreaux [2016], Fung et al. [2014], Krishnan et al. 
[2014], Gipper et al. [2015]). However, these studies rely on the timing of PCAOB 
inspections rather than the content of the inspection reports.
4 
Evidence linking the content of 
PCAOB inspection reports to subsequent audit outcomes is important because it provides 
relatively direct evidence that PCAOB inspections have a causal effect on audit quality. We 
further strengthen our causal inferences using a fixed effects design that is similar to a 
difference-in-differences estimation with a continuous treatment (e.g., Carpenter and 
Dobkin, 2011). We acknowledge, however, that like most accounting studies, we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that PCAOB inspections are endogenously related to 
future internal control opinions. 
In addition, most studies test for remediation by restricting their analysis to audit 
firms located outside of the US (Lamoreaux [2016], Fung et al. [2014], Krishnan et al. 
[2014]).
5
 The focus on non-US auditors is likely due to inherent research design challenges in 
establishing an association between PCAOB inspections and subsequent remediation by US 
                                                          
4
 Gramling et al. [2011] find no association between going-concern deficiencies reported by inspectors and 
subsequent going-concern opinions issued by triennially inspected audit firms (i.e., audit firms with fewer than 
100 clients), perhaps because going-concern deficiencies are rarely mentioned in PCAOB inspection reports. 
While Drake et al. [2016] find that Deloitte remediated the tax audit deficiencies disclosed in its 2007 Part II 
inspection report, their results may not generalize to other audit firms and inspections.  
5
 Exceptions are concurrent working papers by Aobdia [2016] and Gipper et al. [2015]. Gipper et al. [2015] 
addresses the research design challenge by examining the staggered introduction of PCAOB inspections over 
time, however, they do not examine the content of PCAOB inspection reports and so they are unable to show 
that audit firms remediate the problems identified by the inspectors. Aobdia [2016] addresses the design issue by 
examining engagement-specific inspection data from the PCAOB, but does not examine the effects of 
deficiencies on auditors‟ reporting decisions. 
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audit firms. Identifying an appropriate control group of uninspected US auditors is difficult 
because all US public company audit firms are subject to inspections.
 
In contrast, foreign 
auditors are only subject to PCAOB inspections when they have audit clients listed in the US, 
making it easier to test whether PCAOB inspections have remediation benefits among non-
US audit firms (Lamoreaux [2016], Fung et al. [2014], Krishnan et al. [2014]). We address 
this challenge by examining differences in the content of PCAOB inspection reports over 
time. Our results suggest that auditors respond to PCAOB criticisms of their internal control 
audits by conducting more rigorous tests and evaluations of clients‟ internal control 
weaknesses after they are inspected. Our study illustrates the benefits of examining the 
content of PCAOB inspection reports when testing whether the inspections prompt audit 
firms to make remedial improvements to audit quality. 
We also contribute to the literature on the auditor‟s opinion formulation process. 
While a large literature examines how auditors formulate their financial statement audit 
opinions, few studies examine how they formulate their internal control audit opinions 
(Ashbaugh et al. [2007], Doyle et al. [2007], Rice and Weber [2012]). Our study adds to the 
literature by showing that the downward trend in adverse internal control opinions from 
2005-2009 reversed, with auditors becoming increasingly likely to issue adverse opinions 
from 2010-2013. Moreover, our findings are consistent with this reversal being explained by 
the PCAOB‟s increased emphasis on internal control audits from 2010 onwards. That is, our 
results are consistent with the PCAOB responding to the SEC‟s concerns by using its 
inspection program to improve the ability of auditors to identify and report material internal 
control weaknesses. 
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2. Background and Motivation 
2.1 THE USE OF PCAOB INSPECTIONS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL AUDITS 
 
Section 404 requires external auditors to opine on the effectiveness of clients‟ internal 
controls over financial reporting. Auditors must issue adverse opinions to clients with 
material weaknesses in their internal controls. The first internal control audits were 
performed under Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), which was widely criticized for requiring 
duplication of effort, resulting in excessive audit fees (Franzel [2014)]. The PCAOB 
investigated this criticism by focusing its 2006 inspections on assessing the efficiency of 
audits conducted under AS2 (PCAOB [2006]). Confirming the widespread criticism of AS2, 
the PCAOB replaced AS2 with Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) in November, 2007. AS5 
attempts to improve upon AS2 by using a risk-based approach that eliminates unnecessary 
auditing procedures, thereby reducing audit fees (PCAOB [2007]).
6
 
During 2007-2009, the PCAOB used its inspection program to monitor the transition 
from AS2 to AS5, and identified a number of audit deficiencies, which they summarized in a 
2009 report (PCAOB [2009]). Shortly thereafter, the SEC reported a decline in auditors‟ 
issuance of adverse internal control opinions during 2005-2009, and suggested that the 
decline might result from auditors failing to identify or report material internal control 
weaknesses:   
“the number of registrants reporting material weaknesses continues to decline. This 
decline could be due to registrants, on average, having addressed previously 
reported material weaknesses, while also having controlled all of the unique 
financial reporting risks introduced by recent economic conditions. Although this is 
possible given the focus and significant attention by registrants on managing 
financial reporting risks, another skeptical view is this trend could also be due to 
material weaknesses not being identified or reported” (SEC [2009]).7 
 
                                                          
6
 Doogar et al. [2010] find that the switch from AS2 to AS5 resulted in significant fee reductions. 
7
 Consistent with internal control weaknesses being underreported, Rice and Weber [2012] document that only 
32 percent of restating companies disclose the existence of a material internal control weakness during the 
misstated time period.  
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In response to these concerns, the PCAOB changed the focus of its inspections to 
more closely scrutinize internal control audits (Franzel [2014]). Beginning with the 2010 
inspections, the inspectors increasingly focused on assessing whether auditors were obtaining 
sufficient evidence to support their internal control opinions. In 2013, citing the large 
numbers of deficiencies reported in their inspections during 2010-2013, the PCAOB issued 
Staff Practice Alert No. 11, which provides auditor guidance in properly conducting internal 
control audits (PCAOB [2013]). 
2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The literature identifies several reasons why PCAOB inspections may not be a viable 
tool for improving audit quality. One is that the inspectors lack the ability to identify 
deficiencies whose remediation would improve internal control audits. For example, based on 
interviews with practicing auditors, Glover, Prawitt and Taylor [2009] suggest that inspectors 
lack the competence or expertise to understand complex auditing and accounting issues, and 
that inspection feedback is slow and ineffective. They conclude that the inspection process is 
fundamentally flawed and the inspections are creating an environment that is both inefficient 
and dysfunctional. Similarly, Dowling, Knechel and Moroney [2015] suggest that inspections 
motivate auditors to manage regulatory risk at the neglect of audit risk. They conclude that 
the PCAOB‟s enforcement techniques cause auditors to focus on trivial minutiae, and this 
change of auditor focus may actually impair audit quality. Johnson et al. [2015] suggest that 
the deficiencies identified during inspections may capture legitimate differences in 
professional judgment, rather than true audit deficiencies.  
There is also criticism that auditors respond to inspector criticism by engaging in 
behavior that does not improve audit quality. For example, auditors often allege that 
deficiencies primarily involve a lack of audit documentation, a complaint that is denied by 
the PCAOB (Dowling et al. [2015], PCAOB [2012a] page 5). In particular, auditors argue 
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that they perform the appropriate auditing procedures, but simply fail to document them to 
the satisfaction of the inspectors.
8
 While remediating such deficiencies through increased 
documentation may appease the inspectors, it will not affect the auditor‟s opinion. 
Another potential threat to the effectiveness of PCAOB inspections is that the 
inspected engagements are not randomly chosen (Dowling et al. [2015]).
9
 If the identified 
deficiencies are not representative of the audit firms‟ procedures, auditors are less likely to 
remediate, and remediation is less likely to have firm-wide effects on audit quality. An 
additional obstacle is that audit firms have incentives to avoid costly remediation, because 
clients may be reluctant to accept increased fees that result from increased audit effort 
triggered by remediation (Dowling et al. [2015]). In addition, if remediation increases the 
issuance of adverse opinions, it also increases the risk of auditor dismissal (Ettredge et al. 
[2011]; Newton et al. [2016]; Johnson et al. [2015]). 
Despite the above criticisms of PCAOB inspections, if the inspectors do identify 
systematic firm-wide deficiencies, then audit firms have strong incentives to remediate their 
procedures. The PCAOB can impose penalties on auditors that provide substandard audits 
(Cohn [2015a], Cohn [2015b], Cohn [2015c]), including public censure, permanent 
revocation of PCAOB registration, barring individuals from associating with registered audit 
firms, and the imposition of fines. A recent annual report by the PCAOB indicates that it 
settled 24 disciplinary cases against auditors during 2014 (PCAOB [2015a]). 
Audit firms also provide incentives to receive clean inspection reports by imposing 
financial penalties on audit teams who receive critical inspections, and by making inspection 
                                                          
8
 PCAOB [2012a] disagrees that the absence of audit documentation alone results in inspection deficiencies. 
Inspectors also consider whether there is other persuasive evidence to support a firm's contention that it 
performed undocumented procedures. Thus, there must be both the absence of documentation and the absence 
of other persuasive evidence that the procedure was performed, consistent with the requirements of AS3.  
9
 The PCAOB inspectors do not examine every audit and their tests are not designed to identify every possible 
deficiency (Franzel [2014]). The PCAOB selects audits for inspection based on risk factors (PCAOB [2012b]), 
and only the higher-risk portions of an audit are typically examined during the inspections.  
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deficiencies one of the criteria in evaluating promotions to partner (Johnson et al. [2015]). 
Remediation is facilitated by in-house training programs that are designed to provide the 
knowledge to perform PCAOB-compliant audits. These programs include frequent 
debriefings on the latest PCAOB inspection findings. This suggests that auditors are capable 
of responding quickly to the deficiencies identified in the inspections.  
In summary, if the PCAOB inspections are able to identify systemic audit 
deficiencies, then their remediation should improve the ability of auditors to identify and 
report material weaknesses in internal controls. The greater the number of audits with 
identified deficiencies relative to the number of engagements inspected, the more systemic 
the identified problems are likely to be, and the stronger the signal to the auditing firm that 
remediation is required. Thus, the greater the rate of internal control deficiencies identified in 
the inspection reports, the greater the likelihood of auditors remediating their procedures to 
detect and report material internal control weaknesses. Since auditors are required to issue 
adverse opinions to clients that are found to have material internal control weaknesses, this 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: Companies are more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions after 
their audit firms receive PCAOB inspection reports with higher internal control 
deficiency rates. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 SAMPLE PERIOD 
Data come from the Audit Analytics database, COMPUSTAT, and the PCAOB 
website. Our sample comprises internal control reports with fiscal year-ends from January 1, 
2010 through December 31, 2013. We begin our sample in 2010 because this is the year in 
which the PCAOB shifted its inspection efforts towards assessing whether auditors obtain 
sufficient evidence to support their internal control opinions. Importantly, 2010 is also the 
first year in which the PCAOB disclosed the number of audit engagements examined in their 
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annual audit firm inspections. Disclosing the number of each audit firm‟s inspected 
engagements allows us to compute the rate of internal control audit deficiencies for each 
audit firm inspection, which is a central feature of our research design.  
3.2 MEASURING THE POST-INSPECTION WINDOW 
Our primary tests examine whether auditors issue more adverse internal control 
reports subsequent to receiving PCAOB inspection reports that disclose relatively high rates 
of deficiencies in internal control audits. Our “post-inspection window” begins with the issue 
date of the most recent inspection report and ends with the date prior to the issuance of the 
next inspection report. Fig. 1 illustrates how we measure the post-inspection window for 
annually inspected and triennially inspected audit firms. For example, the PCAOB issued 
inspection reports to Deloitte & Touche on May 4, 2010, Dec 7, 2011, Nov 28, 2012, May 7, 
2013, and May 6, 2014. Thus, the post-inspection window for the May 4, 2010 report begins 
on May 4, 2010, the day the report was issued, and ends on Dec 6, 2011, the day before the 
next inspection report is issued. Hence, we use the internal control audit deficiency rate in 
Deloitte‟s May 4, 2010 report to predict the internal control opinions issued by Deloitte to its 
clients during the period from May 4, 2010 to Dec 6, 2011. Similarly, the post-inspection 
window for Deloitte‟s Dec 7, 2011 report begins Dec 7, 2011 and ends on Nov 27, 2012, the 
day before the next inspection report is issued. Therefore, we use the internal control audit 
deficiency rate in Deloitte‟s Dec 7, 2011 report to predict the internal control opinions issued 
by Deloitte to its clients during the period from Dec 7, 2011 to Nov 27, 2012. 
The post-inspection window for the triennially inspected audit firms is longer because 
they are inspected less frequently. For example, the PCAOB issued inspection reports to 
Brown, Edwards and Company on Sept 30, 2008, Aug 3, 2011, and Feb 27, 2014. The post-
inspection window for the Sept 30, 2008 report begins on Sept 30, 2008 and ends on Aug 2, 
2011, just before the next inspection report is issued; and the post-inspection window for the 
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Aug 3, 2011 report begins on Aug 3, 2011 and ends on Feb 26, 2014, just before the next 
inspection report is issued. 
3.3 MODEL OF ADVERSE INTERNAL CONTROL REPORTS 
We test our hypothesis by estimating eq. (1), which models the auditor‟s decision to 
issue an adverse internal control opinion: 
ICOPi,t = α1 DEF_IC%i,t + α2 DEF_NOT_IC%i,t  + CONTROLS  
+ Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u  (1) 
 
The dependent variable (ICOPi,t) is a client-year variable that equals one if the auditor issues 
an adverse internal control opinion to company i in year t, where year t belongs to the post-
inspection window, and equals 0 otherwise. The post-inspection window captures the period 
immediately following the issuance of the audit firm‟s inspection report. See Fig. 1 for 
further details about the measurement of the post-inspection window. Because accounting 
restatements can prompt revisions to previously issued clean internal control opinions, we use 
the originally-issued internal control opinion in cases where the opinion has been revised. 
 Our treatment variable is the internal control deficiency rate (DEF_IC%i,t), which is 
measured at the audit firm-level and equals the number of audits by company i‟s audit firm 
that are found by PCAOB inspectors to have internal control deficiencies, divided by the total 
number of audits examined in the inspection, where the PCAOB inspection occurs at the start 
of the post-inspection window and prior to the auditor‟s issuance of the internal control 
opinion for year t. We expect audit firms to issue more adverse internal control reports 
following PCAOB inspection reports that disclose higher deficiency rates. We therefore 
predict a positive coefficient on DEF_IC%i,t (i.e., α1 > 0).  
 PCAOB inspection reports also disclose deficiencies that are unrelated to internal 
control audits, primarily deficiencies in substantive testing and analytical procedures. We 
expect auditors to modify their internal control procedures in response to internal control 
deficiencies, but not in response to deficiencies unrelated to internal controls. This allows us 
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to conduct a falsification test by including in Eq. (1) the variable DEF_NOT_IC%i,t, which 
equals the number of audits by company i‟s audit firm that are found by PCAOB inspectors 
to have deficiencies unrelated to internal control audits, divided by the total number of audits 
examined in the inspection. Because these deficiencies are unrelated to internal control 
audits, we expect an insignificant coefficient on DEF_NOT_IC%i,t.
10
 
 We include Year fixed effects in eq. (1) to control for time variation in adverse internal 
control reports. We also control for Audit firm fixed effects because the reporting of internal 
control weaknesses is likely to vary across audit firms. By controlling for audit firm and year 
fixed effects, our empirical identification strategy resembles a difference-in-differences 
estimation with a continuous treatment (e.g., Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011). In particular, we 
test whether auditors issue more adverse internal control reports subsequent to PCAOB 
inspectors reporting higher deficiency rates in internal control audits. 
3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
We include several control variables based on prior research (Ashbaugh et al. [2007], 
Doyle et al. [2007], Rice and Weber [2012]). The motivation for each of the control variables 
is discussed in Section I of the Internet Appendix, and the variable definitions are presented 
in the Appendix to this text.  
4. Results 
4.1 TRENDS IN ADVERSE INTERNAL CONTROL AUDIT OPINIONS AND INSPECTION 
DEFICIENCIES 
 
4.1.1 Trends in Auditors’ Issuance of Adverse Internal Control Opinions 
 
We begin by assessing the SEC‟s assertion that the incidence of adverse internal 
control opinions declined from 2005-2009 (SEC [2009]), and the PCAOB‟s assertion that the 
                                                          
10
 A PCAOB inspection report may disclose that an inspected audit has both internal control deficiencies and 
other types of deficiencies. These audits are captured by the DEF_IC%i,t variable. DEF_NOT_IC%i,t captures 
the audits that are found to have deficiencies that are unrelated to internal controls. 
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incidence of reported deficiencies in internal control audits increased after inspectors 
increased their scrutiny of internal control audits during 2010-2013 (PCAOB [2013]). Col. 
(1) of Table 1 reports the frequency of adverse opinions during 2005-2013. Col. (2) reports 
the same information for the sub-sample of companies whose financial statements are 
misstated in the year of the audit report, as revealed by a subsequent restatement. Thus, Col. 
(2) is a sub-sample of companies for which adverse opinions are warranted.  
Consistent with the SEC‟s assertions, Col. (1) reports a downward trend in adverse 
internal control reports from 2005-2009, particularly after 2007, which marks the transition 
from AS2 to AS5. Panel A shows that the proportion of adverse opinions issued for Big Four 
clients declines from 10.0% in 2005 to 6.3% in 2007, then to 2.6% in 2009.
11
 Col. (2) of 
Table 1 also reports a downward trend in adverse internal control reports from 2005-2009 for 
companies with concurrent misstatements. Panel A shows that the proportion of adverse 
opinions issued to Big Four clients with concurrent misstatements declines from 19.9% in 
2005 to 13.8% in 2007, then to 4.9% in 2009. Similar downward trends are observed for the 
clients of annually inspected non-Big Four auditors in Panel B, and for the clients of 
triennially inspected auditors in Panel C.
12
 
Cols. (1) and (2) also document that the downward trend in adverse opinions ends in 
2010, then subsequently reverses. Col. (1) of Panel A indicates that the proportion of adverse 
reports among the clients of Big Four auditors rises from 1.9% in 2010 to 3.6% in 2013.
13
 A 
similar pattern occurs in the sub-sample of misstatement firms in Col. (2), and for the clients 
                                                          
11
 Regressing ICOPi,t on the time trend for 2005-2009 finds a significant negative coefficient of -0.283 (z-stat. = 
-17.55). 
12
 The proportion of internal control audits with adverse opinions is generally higher for triennially inspected 
auditors across all years, which is consistent with the clients of triennially inspected auditors having poorer 
internal controls compared with the clients of annually inspected auditors. 
13
 Regressing ICOPi,t on the time trend for 2010-2013 finds a significant positive coefficient of 0.089 (z-stat. = 
2.34). 
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of annually inspected non-Big Four auditors in Panel B, and the clients of triennially 
inspected auditors in Panel C.  
One minus the percentages reported in Col. (2) gives what are often referred to as 
“Type II” error rates. In the context of internal control opinions, Type II errors refer to 
engagements where the auditor issues a clean opinion to a client whose financials are 
concurrently misstated. The presence of a concurrent misstatement indicates that the auditor 
erroneously issued a clean opinion, because misstatements can only occur in companies with 
material weaknesses (Rice and Weber [2012]). We caution, however, that this understates the 
true Type II error rate, because clients can have undetected (and hence unreported) material 
internal control weaknesses that never result in a misstatement (or result in a misstatement that 
is never discovered). Thus, the issuance of a clean opinion for a client that does not report a 
concurrent misstatement does not necessarily mean that the auditor issued the “correct” 
opinion.  
With the above caveat in mind, the percentages shown in Col. (2) suggest that Type II 
error rates increased over 2005-2009, growing from 80.1% in 2005 (100% − 19.9%), to 
95.1% in 2009 (100% − 4.9%). The Type II error rates then declined over 2010-2013, falling 
from 96.2% in 2010 (100% − 3.8%), to 91% in 2013 (100% − 9%). These trends are 
consistent with the SEC‟s concerns that the quality of internal control audits declined during 
2005-2009, then increased after the PCAOB increased their scrutiny of internal control audits 
during 2010-2013.
14
 
Finally, Col. (2) indicates that the Type II error rates for internal control audits are 
high, consistent with prior research that also documents a low rate of adverse opinions among 
firms with concurrent misstatements (Rice and Weber, 2012). This low rate is expected, since 
                                                          
14
 We note that computing Type I errors would be problematic because an adverse opinion is not a prediction of a 
concurrent or future misstatement. Rather, adverse opinions indicate the presence of a material weakness that 
presents “a reasonable possibility” (under AS2) or “more than a remote possibility” (under AS5) that a material 
misstatement would not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.  
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auditors who fail to identify misstatements are also likely to fail to identify material 
weaknesses. Allowing a material misstatement to go undetected is an indication of a low 
quality audit, which is consistent with the auditor also failing to identify and report material 
weaknesses in internal controls. 
4.1.2 Trends in Inspections that Report Deficiencies in Internal Control Audits 
 
Cols. (3) through (5) of Table 1 report information from the PCAOB inspection 
reports, which we use to calculate the audit firms‟ deficiency rates (DEF_IC%i,t). Col. (3) 
reports the mean number of inspected audits with deficiencies, Col. (4) the mean number of 
audits examined in each inspection, and Col. (5) the mean deficiency rate per inspection, 
computed by dividing Col. (3) by Col. (4).15 Cols. (3) and (5) show that, beginning in 2010, 
there is an upward trend in both the number and proportion of inspected audits with reported 
deficiencies. For example, Panel A indicates that the mean number (proportion) of Big Four 
audits with deficiencies increases from 2.50 (3.78%) in 2010 to 16.50 (32.65%) in 2013. A 
similar pattern is found for the annually inspected non-Big Four firms in Panel B, and (to a 
lesser degree) for the triennially inspected auditors in Panel C. This pattern is consistent with 
the PCAOB‟s assertion that it intensified its examination of internal control audits during 
2010-2013, and with the PCAOB ratcheting up its scrutiny of internal control audits in each 
successive year, as suggested in PCAOB [2014]. 
4.1.3 Evaluating the Trends in Internal Control Opinions and Inspection Deficiencies 
 
The trends in Table 1 are consistent with the SEC‟s assertions that the quality of 
internal control audits may have declined during 2005-2009, and with the PCAOB 
responding by increasing its scrutiny of internal control audits during 2010-2013. There are, 
however, other potential explanations for the univariate time trends in Table 1. For example, 
                                                          
15
 The inspection reports do not disclose whether the inspected audit is a SOX 404 audit or a non-SOX 404 
audit. Therefore, the denominator for the deficiency rate cannot be restricted to SOX 404 audits. The deficiency 
rates for the triennially inspected auditors in Col. (4) are lower than those for the annually inspected auditors 
because a higher proportion of their clients are not subject to SOX 404.  
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the downward trend in adverse opinions over 2005-2009 could be explained by 
improvements in companies‟ internal controls, and by the transition to AS5, which increased 
the threshold for classifying material weaknesses from “more than remote” to “reasonably 
possible.” Thus, we cannot conclude from the time trends in Table 1 that the quality of 
internal control audits declined during 2005-2009. Importantly, we emphasize that our 
hypothesis does not assume that the declining trend in adverse opinions during 2005-2009 
indicates a decline in the quality of internal control audits (as suggested by the SEC). 
However, if our hypothesis is supported, this would be consistent with the inspectors‟ 
increased focus on internal control audits helping to improve the quality of internal control 
audits during 2010-2013. 
We also note that the upward trend in adverse opinions during 2010-2013 does not 
necessarily imply that the quality of internal control audits improves over this period. An 
alternative explanation is that the trend is due to changes in macroeconomic factors. For 
example, the quality of internal controls among the population of accelerated filers may have 
deteriorated over this period. This could result from managers failing to update their internal 
control systems to accommodate changes in the economic environment, leading auditors to 
issue more adverse opinions. Because these macro-level factors may help explain the upward 
trend in adverse opinions during 2010-2013, we control for them by including year fixed 
effects in our multivariate tests. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample, which comprises 13,933 
internal control reports for fiscal years 2010-2013, issued by 102 audit firms, 8 of which are 
annually inspected and 94 of which are triennially inspected. The vast majority of internal 
control reports are issued by the Big Four (N = 11,778). The annually inspected non-Big Four 
firms issue 1,280 internal control reports, while the 94 triennially inspected non-Big Four 
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firms issue 875. The proportion of adverse opinions ranges from 1.90% to 3.04% for the Big 
Four, and 1.92% to 5.35% for the other auditors. The lower proportion among Big Four 
auditors is likely because their clients have higher quality internal controls and hence are less 
likely to receive adverse opinions. 
Table 2 shows that our sample includes 342 inspections: 32 for the eight annually 
inspected audit firms (four for each audit firm), and 310 for the 94 triennially inspected audit 
firms. Averaged over the four sample years (2010-2013), the percentages of inspected 
engagements with deficiencies in internal control audits ranges from 9.95% to 27.56% for the 
annually inspected auditors, and is 4.83% for the triennially inspected auditors.
16
 Because the 
PCAOB inspection process is not random, however, these rates are likely to exceed the audit 
firms‟ true underlying deficiency rates.17  
Table 3 reports the mean values of the independent variables after partitioning the 
sample by the type of internal control report. There are 409 client-year observations with 
adverse opinions, and 13,524 with clean opinions issued during the post-inspection windows. 
Consistent with PCAOB inspection efforts remediating auditor behavior, we find a significant 
positive association between the deficiency rate and auditors‟ subsequent issuance of adverse 
opinions during the post-inspection windows. The average deficiency rate (DEF_IC%i,t) is 
19.48% in the sub-sample with adverse opinions, and 16.83% in the sub-sample with clean 
opinions, with the difference highly significant (t-stat. = 3.98).
18
 However, this univariate test 
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 Although untabulated, there is a relatively large variation in the percentage of inspected audits with internal 
control audit deficiencies. For example, Grant Thornton‟s internal control audit deficiency rate increases from 
2.56% in 2010 to 48.39% in 2013, whereas McGladrey‟s rate increases from 5.61% in 2010 to 9.29% in 2013. 
17
 The much smaller rate of deficiencies among triennially inspected auditors arises because most of their clients 
are non-accelerated filers, who do not require internal control audits under SOX Section 404. When auditing 
non-accelerated filers, auditors only need to test the controls that they intend to rely upon, and can skip tests of 
internal controls that they believe are too weak to provide a basis for reliance (in which case they rely on 
substantive tests instead). Thus, because triennially inspected auditors are generally required to perform fewer 
tests of internal controls, PCAOB inspectors are less likely to identify internal control audit deficiencies on 
those engagements. 
18
 While not tabulated, the median values of DEF_IC%i,t are 18.31% when ICOPi,t = 1 and 13.46% when ICOPi,t 
= 0, and the difference is significant at the 1% level two-tailed (Chi
2
 = 10.17). 
  22 
does not control for other factors that explain internal control reporting, so we draw our 
conclusions from the multivariate tests in Table 4. 
Importantly, we find an insignificant association between deficiencies that are 
unrelated to internal controls and subsequent adverse opinions. The average deficiency rate 
for audits whose deficiencies are unrelated to internal controls (DEF_NOT_IC%i,t) is 12.89% 
in the sub-sample with adverse opinions and 12.11% in the sub-sample with clean opinions. 
The difference is insignificant at conventional levels.  
Univariate results for the control variables are generally consistent with expectations. 
An auditor is significantly more likely to issue an adverse opinion when the client: 1) 
receives an adverse opinion in the prior year (ICOPi,t-1), 2) misstates its financial statements 
(MISSTATEi,t), 3) recently experiences an auditor resignation (RESIGNi,t), 4) has lower non-
audit service fees (Ln(NAS)i,t), 5) is smaller (SIZEi,t), 6) reports a loss (LOSSi,t), 7) has foreign 
operations (FOREIGNi,t), and 8) has more inventory (INVENTORYi,t). The other control 
variables are not statistically significant.  
4.3 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Table 4 reports the regression results for Eq. (1). The standard errors are corrected for 
clustering on each company because there are repeated annual observations during our 
sample period (2010-2013).
19
 Col. (1) reports results for all auditors, while Cols (2) and (3) 
report results separately for the Big Four and Non-Big Four auditors. Consistent with higher 
deficiency rates leading to an increase in adverse opinions, Col. (1) reports a positive 
coefficient on DEF_IC%i,t, the deficiency rate during the audit firm‟s most recent inspection, 
and the DEF_IC%i,t coefficient is highly significant (z-stat. = 5.70). This indicates that audit 
firms issue more adverse opinions after they receive PCAOB inspection reports with higher 
deficiency rates in internal control audits. These findings are consistent with audit firms 
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 Our inferences are unchanged if the standard errors are clustered on each audit firm. 
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responding to critical inspections by remediating their audit procedures related to internal 
controls during the post-inspection windows. Cols. (2) and (3) find that the coefficients on 
DEF_IC%i,t are significantly positive for both Big Four and Non-Big Four auditors (z-stats. = 
4.47 and 3.28).
20
 We also find that, as DEF_IC%i,t increases from the 25
th
 percentile (4.0%) 
to the 75
th
 percentile (27.3%), the predicted probability of an adverse opinion nearly doubles 
from 2.07% to 3.89%. Therefore, our results are economically significant as well as 
statistically significant. 
 Notably, we do not find significant results for inspector-reported deficiencies that are 
unrelated to internal controls. The coefficients on DEF_NOT_IC%i,t are insignificant at 
conventional levels in all three regressions. Therefore, while auditors‟ internal control 
opinions are associated with the internal control deficiencies found by PCAOB inspectors, 
they are not associated with the other types of audit deficiencies. Results for the control 
variables are generally consistent with the univariate analysis in Table 3 and prior research.  
 While the Table 4 results are consistent with the quality of internal control audits 
increasing during 2010-2013, we note that the proportion of identified deficiencies also 
increased over this period (Table 1). There are several potential explanations for the upward 
trend in the deficiency rate from 2010-2013 even as audit quality was improving. One is that 
the PCAOB was “ratcheting” up its scrutiny in each successive year. This is consistent with 
the PCAOB indicating that it used feedback from the internal control audit inspections each 
year to direct the focus of subsequent inspections (PCAOB [2014]). This ratcheting up over 
time is also consistent with auditors‟ assertions that the requirements for meeting the 
PCAOB‟s expectations have increased over time (Johnson et al. [2015]). 
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 The coefficient on DEF_IC%i,t is significantly larger for the Big Four audit firms than the Non-Big Four (p-
value < 0.01). This suggests that there is a stronger remediation effect for the Big Four audit firms.  
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 In addition, because the inspectors do not inspect the entire engagement, a clean 
inspection report does not mean that all areas of the inspected audit are satisfactory. Thus, 
even if an engagement receives a clean inspection report, an identical engagement could 
receive a deficient report in the subsequent year, even if the two engagement teams perform 
identical procedures (Johnson et al. [2015]). Further, effective remediation may not occur 
simultaneously across all engagements within an audit firm (Tysiac [2014]).
21
 Therefore, even 
when an audit firm remediates, some engagements may still contain deficiencies. 
4.4 TYPES OF INTERNAL CONTROL DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED BY PCAOB 
INSPECTORS 
 
This section examines whether PCAOB inspectors focus on deficiencies in internal 
control testing (i.e., the audit process) or internal control reporting (i.e., audit outcomes). This 
is important because remediation is meaningful only if auditors improve the specific 
deficiencies identified by the inspectors, rather than simply issuing more adverse opinions. If 
most of the identified deficiencies involve audit testing rather than audit reporting, audit 
firms are unlikely to satisfy the inspectors merely by issuing more adverse opinions.  
We begin by classifying the identified deficiencies (DEF_IC%i,t) into two broad 
categories: (1) inadequate tests of internal controls, which potentially result in failing to 
detect the existence of a material weakness; and (2) inappropriate evaluation of the 
materiality of a detected weakness, which potentially results in failing to report a material 
weakness. We define inadequate tests (DEF_IC_TEST%i,t) as the number of audits where the 
PCAOB inspectors concluded that the auditor failed to adequately test internal controls, 
divided by the total number of audits examined during the inspection. We define failures to 
appropriately evaluate materiality (DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t) as the number of audits where 
the PCAOB inspectors indicate that the auditor failed to adequately evaluate the materiality 
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 This is consistent with comments by PCAOB board member Jay Hansen: “The problems usually lie in the 
execution. Do the teams actually follow the methodologies? And that‟s where we see inconsistencies from 
engagement team to engagement team within firms” (Tysiac [2014]).  
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of an identified weakness, divided by the total number of audits examined during the 
inspection. Panel A of Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for these variables. The mean 
value of DEF_IC_TEST%i,t is 16.90% while the mean value of DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t is 
1.82%.
22
 Therefore, most deficiencies relate to inadequate testing rather than inadequate 
evaluation of materiality.  
We emphasize that the deficiencies identified by inspectors do not necessarily mean 
that the auditor failed to identify or report an existing material weakness. Rather, they 
indicate that the auditor failed to properly test for a material weakness (DEF_IC_TEST%i,t), 
or failed to properly evaluate the materiality of a detected weakness 
(DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t). None of the inspection reports in our sample speculate on 
whether the proper performance of the test or the proper evaluation of the weakness would 
have resulted in the auditor issuing an adverse opinion.  
We disaggregate DEF_IC_TEST%i,t into three sub-categories, which describe the type 
of test that the inspectors assert was inadequately performed: (1) inadequate tests of specific 
account balances (DEF_IC_TEST_AC%i,t), (2) inadequate tests of information technology 
controls (DEF_IC_TEST_IT%i,t), and (3) inadequate tests due to over-reliance on the work of 
others (DEF_IC_TEST_OTHERS%i,t). These (non-mutually exclusive) variables are 
measured similar to DEF_IC_TEST%i,t, as described in Table 5. Panel B of Table 5 reports 
descriptive statistics on each of these three types of testing deficiency. The mean value of 
DEF_IC_TEST_AC%i,t is 15.80%, the mean value of DEF_IC_TEST_IT%i,t is 2.88%, and the 
mean value of DEF_IC_TEST_OTHERS%i,t is 3.83%. Therefore, the most frequent type of 
deficiency is the failure to adequately test internal controls relating to specific accounts. 
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 All engagements with materiality deficiencies (1.82%) also have testing deficiencies (16.90%). Thus, 15.08% 
of our sample have only testing deficiencies (16.90% − 1.82%), while 1.82% have both materiality and testing 
deficiencies. There are no engagements with only materiality deficiencies. 
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Next, we examine whether the regression results in Table 4 are explained by the 
inspectors‟ detection of inadequate testing (DEF_IC_TEST%i,t) or inadequate evaluation of 
materiality (DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t). If auditors respond to these two types of deficiencies 
by improving both their testing and materiality evaluation, we would expect significant 
positive coefficients on DEF_IC_TEST%i,t and DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t. Panel C of Table 5 
reports regression results for the model of internal control reporting. The first column reports 
significant positive coefficients on both DEF_IC_TEST%i,t (z-stat. = 4.88) and 
DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t (z-stat. = 3.02). Therefore, auditors issue more adverse opinions in 
response to reported deficiencies in their tests of internal controls, as well as in their 
evaluation of the materiality of detected weaknesses. The second column of Panel C reports 
that the results for testing deficiencies (DEF_IC_TEST%i,t) are primarily explained by 
inadequate tests of specific accounts (DEF_IC_TEST_AC%i,t , z-stat. = 4.62). The results for 
the other two types of testing deficiencies are insignificant at conventional levels. 
In summary, Table 5 is consistent with the inspector-identified deficiencies triggering 
subsequent remediation; and with the PCAOB inspections being most effective in 
remediating deficiencies relating to inadequate testing at the account level, and inadequate 
evaluation of the materiality of identified weaknesses. 
4.5 COMPANIES WITH MATERIAL ACCOUNTING MISSTATEMENTS 
 
This section tests whether the inspections prompt auditors to issue adverse opinions to 
clients who genuinely deserve them. If auditors respond to the identified deficiencies by 
issuing adverse opinions to clients who warrant such opinions, we would expect more 
adverse opinions being issued to companies whose financial statements are concurrently 
misstated. This expectation is based on the observation that material misstatements can only 
occur in companies with material weaknesses (Rice and Weber [2012]). We explore this by 
  27 
testing whether the inspector-identified deficiencies prompt auditors to issue adverse opinions 
to companies that subsequently restate a concurrent misstatement.    
To test this, we add a term to Eq. (1) that captures the interaction between our 
treatment variable (DEF_IC%i,t) and the misstatement variable (MISSTATEi,t). Recall that 
MISSTATEi,t captures concurrent period misstatements that are revealed through a restatement 
announced in a subsequent period. 
ICOPi,t = α1 DEF_IC%i,t + α2 DEF_IC%i,t ×MISSTATEi,t + α3 MISSTATEi,t + CONTROLS  
   + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u   (2) 
 
The coefficients in Eq. (2) are interpreted as follows: 
α1 = the effect of DEF_IC%i,t on ICOPi,t for companies without a concurrent 
misstatement. 
 
α2 = the difference in the effect of DEF_IC%i,t on ICOPi,t for companies with and without 
a concurrent misstatement.  
 
α1 + α2 = the effect of DEF_IC%i,t on ICOPi,t for the subset of companies with a 
concurrent misstatement. 
 
α3 = the main effect of MISSTATEi,t on ICOPi,t (when DEF_IC%i,t = 0). 
 
 If auditors issue more adverse opinions to companies that warrant them, we expect 
significantly more adverse opinions to be issued to companies with concurrent misstatements 
(i.e., α1 + α2 > 0). We have no prediction for the companies that do not report a misstatement 
(i.e., α1), because it is unclear whether these companies should receive clean or adverse 
opinions. The issuance of an adverse opinion (under AS5) merely means that there is a 
“reasonable possibility” that a material misstatement will not be prevented or detected on a 
timely basis. An adverse opinion does not necessarily indicate that there is a concurrent 
misstatement, or that such a misstatement would be subsequently detected and restated if it 
did occur. Thus, the absence of a concurrent misstatement does not allow us to infer whether 
the auditor was “correct” in issuing an adverse or a clean opinion. 
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The results for eq. (2) are reported in Table 6. We suppress the results for the control 
variables since they are similar to those reported in Table 4. We find that α1 + α2 is 
significantly positive, indicating that the inspections prompt auditors to issue more adverse 
opinions to companies that warrant them. Table 6 also reports that α1 + α2 is significantly 
positive in the sub-sample of Big Four auditors, but insignificant in the much smaller sample 
of Non-Big Four auditors.  
 We also find positive coefficients on DEF_IC%i,t and MISSTATEi,t. The positive 
coefficient on DEF_IC%i,t implies that auditors issue more adverse opinions even when the 
audited financial statements are not misstated (i.e., MISSTATEi,t = 0). This is consistent with 
the inspection deficiencies prompting auditors to perform additional substantive testing, 
which increases the chance of finding and correcting a misstatement before the financial 
statements are released to investors. The positive coefficient on MISSTATEi,t indicates that 
auditors are more likely to issue an adverse opinion to clients with material misstatements, 
even when the PCAOB inspectors find no deficiencies (i.e., when DEF_IC%i,t = 0). This 
indicates that clients are more likely to have material misstatements when auditors issue 
adverse internal control opinions. Finally, we find an insignificant coefficient on DEF_IC%i,t 
× MISSTATEi,t (z-stat. = -0.46). This is important, because a significant negative coefficient on 
this interaction would indicate that auditors respond to higher deficiency rates (DEF_IC%i,t) 
by issuing fewer adverse internal control opinions to clients with misstatements.
23
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 We note that our analysis does not test whether the reported misstatement relates to the material weakness in 
internal controls that led to the adverse internal control opinion. The adverse opinion should cause the auditor to 
look more closely at the accounts that could be misstated as a result of the material weakness, suggesting that 
these accounts are less likely to be misstated. If the reported misstatement does pertain to the accounts affected 
by the material weakness, it suggests that auditors may not be adequately adapting their audit procedures to the 
increased risks imposed by material control weaknesses. 
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4.6 ADVERSE INTERNAL CONTROL OPINIONS AS INDICATORS OF FUTURE 
RESTATEMENTS 
 
 Companies with material internal control weaknesses are more likely to misstate their 
accounts. Thus, companies that receive adverse internal control opinions are more likely to 
subsequently announce a restatement, implying that adverse opinions are timely indicators of 
the risk of a future restatement. In this section, we test whether adverse internal control 
opinions continue to be timely indicators of future restatements when they are issued 
subsequent to the inspector-identified deficiencies.  
 We explore this by first estimating eq. (3a): 
RESTATEit+1 = α1 ICOPit + α2 DEF_IC%i,t + CONTROLS  
                                     + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u                  (3a)  
 
The dependent variable (RESTATEit+1) equals one if company i announces an accounting 
restatement in the year following the auditor‟s issuance of the internal control opinion. ICOPit 
equals one if the auditor issues an adverse opinion to company i in year t, and zero if the 
auditor issues a clean opinion. We expect α1 > 0 if adverse opinions are timely indicators of 
future restatement risks.  
Next we test whether the adverse opinions that are issued following critical inspection 
reports are less timely signals of future restatements. Specifically, we include the interaction 
term ICOPit × DEF_IC%i,t in eq. (3b): 
RESTATEit+1 = α1 ICOPit + α2 DEF_IC%i,t + α3 ICOPit × DEF_IC%i,t + CONTROLS  
                                     + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u          (3b) 
We expect α3 to be insignificantly different from zero if the ability of adverse opinions to 
predict future restatements is unchanged when the adverse opinions are issued following 
critical PCAOB inspection reports.  
 Table 7 reports the results for Eqs. (3a) and (3b). Consistent with adverse opinions 
being timely predictors of future restatements, we find a positive and highly significant 
coefficient on ICOPit in (3a) (z-stat. = 9.37). Moreover, the ability of adverse opinions to 
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predict future restatements is not impaired when the adverse opinions are triggered by critical 
PCAOB inspection reports. In particular, we find that α3 is insignificant in Eq. (3b). This 
indicates that PCAOB inspection reports do not prompt auditors to issue more adverse 
opinions to companies that have a low risk of future restatement. Together, the results in 
Tables 6 and 7 suggest that PCAOB inspections motivate auditors to issue more adverse 
opinions to companies that genuinely deserve them. 
4.7 DO AUDIT FIRMS ISSUE ADVERSE OPINIONS TO OBTAIN MORE LENIENT 
OUTCOMES IN FUTURE INSPECTIONS? 
 
Another explanation for our results is that audit firms attempt to appease the 
inspectors by issuing more adverse opinions prior to the inspections, in the hope they will 
lead to more lenient inspection outcomes. We consider this alternative explanation unlikely 
because the inspectors focus on deficiencies related to the testing of controls rather than the 
issuance of an adverse opinion (Table 5). Therefore, auditors are unlikely to satisfy the 
inspectors by merely issuing more adverse opinions without concurrent improvements in 
control testing or their evaluation of materiality. Moreover, as early as 2009, the PCAOB 
publicly disclosed that inspectors do not choose to examine an engagement based on whether 
the client previously received a clean or adverse internal control opinion. Specifically, 
PCAOB Release No. 2009-006 states that its inspectors select audit engagements: 
“without regard to whether the ICFR audits resulted in adverse or unqualified 
opinions and without regard to the number or extent of internal control 
deficiencies identified by the engagement team during the audit.” 
 
Thus, the PCAOB asserts that it was not using prior year opinions to select engagements for 
inspection during the period of our analysis.
24
  
                                                          
24
 There are two reasons why reverse causality is unlikely to affect our main results in Table 4. First, inspectors 
are only able to observe past engagements, whereas the dependent variable in Table 4 captures internal control 
reports issued subsequent to the inspection (Fig. 1). Second, Table 4 controls for adverse internal control 
opinions issued during the previous year (ICOPi,t-1), helping to control for selection bias that may arise if 
inspectors select engagements based upon internal control reports issued before the inspection starts. 
  31 
Nevertheless, it is an empirical question whether the PCAOB actually followed this 
policy. If they did not, then auditors may have learned over time that they could appease the 
inspectors and obtain more lenient inspection outcomes by simply issuing more adverse 
opinions. We investigate this by testing whether internal control opinions issued prior to the 
inspections are associated with the deficiency rates subsequently reported by the inspectors. 
For example, the inspection report issued to Deloitte & Touche on Dec 7, 2011 discloses that 
the inspection began in October 2009. Thus, we test whether the deficiency rate disclosed in 
the Dec 7, 2011 inspection report is associated with the internal control opinions previously 
issued by Deloitte and Touche during the period leading up to October 2009. In this example, 
the “pre-inspection” window for Deloitte & Touche‟s inspection report issued on Dec 7, 2011 
is measured from October 1, 2008 (the start of the previous year‟s inspection) to September 
30, 2009 (the day before the start of the current year‟s inspection).  
We test whether internal control opinions issued during the pre-inspection window are 
associated with subsequent inspection outcomes by estimating eq. (4): 
PRE_ICOPi,t = β1 DEF_IC%i,t + CONTROLS    
  + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u     (4) 
 
PRE_ICOPi,t equals one if the auditor issues an adverse internal control report to company i 
in year t, where year t belongs to the pre-inspection window, and zero otherwise. If audit 
firms issue adverse opinions in order to receive more favorable outcomes in the next 
inspection, we would expect a significant negative association between PRE_ICOPi,t and 
DEF_IC%i,t ; i.e., β1 < 0.  
 Table 8 reports the results from eq. (4) and finds that β1 is insignificant in all three 
models. This is consistent with auditors being unable to obtain more favorable inspection 
outcomes merely by issuing more adverse opinions in the period prior to the inspection 
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starting.
25
 This suggests that auditors need to genuinely improve their internal control audit 
procedures rather than simply issue more adverse opinions.  
 We note, however, that while the evidence suggests that the PCAOB followed its 
stated policy of not selecting engagements based on the prior year‟s internal control opinion, 
we do not know what the inspectors privately communicated to the audit teams. If the 
inspectors privately indicated that inspected engagements were chosen based on the prior 
opinion, auditors may still have changed their behavior in an attempt to influence future 
inspections. Thus, while we do not find that PCAOB inspection outcomes are affected by 
internal control opinions issued in the prior year, we are unable to directly observe whether 
auditors changed their opinions in an attempt to manipulate the inspection process.    
4.8 PCAOB INSPECTION DEFICIENCIES AND SUBSEQUENT AUDIT FEES 
If critical PCAOB inspection reports spur auditors to conduct more rigorous internal 
control audits, and if clients absorb those costs, we expect audit fees to increase following 
inspections with higher deficiency rates. In contrast, if audit firms respond to deficiencies by 
mechanically issuing more adverse opinions, we do not expect an increase in audit fees. We 
test this by estimating the following audit fee model: 
Ln(AF)i,t = α1 DEF_IC%i,t + α2 DEF_NOT_IC%i,t + CONTROLS  
+ Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u  (5) 
 
This model regresses the log of audit fees on the rate of reported internal control audit 
deficiencies (DEF_IC%i,t), the rate of deficiencies unrelated to internal control audits 
(DEF_NOT_IC%i,t), lagged audit fees (Ln(AF)i,t-1), and additional control variables.  
Table 9 presents results for the audit fee model, with the sample dropping from 
13,933 to 13,873 observations because we require data on lagged audit fees. Col. (1) reports 
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 We also rerun this analysis using DEF_IC%i,t as the dependent variable, and include PRE_ICOPi,t as an 
independent variable (along with all of the control variables). This analysis (not tabled) finds an insignificant 
coefficient on PRE_ICOPi,t for the full sample, and for the sub-samples of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors 
(t-stats. = -0.28, -1.45, 0.32, respectively). Thus, this additional analysis also indicates that auditors are unable to 
game the inspections by issuing more adverse internal control opinions prior to the inspection. 
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results for all auditors, while Cols. (2) and (3) report results for the Big Four and Non-Big 
Four auditors. We find significant positive coefficients on DEF_IC%i,t in all three samples (t-
stats. = 3.13, 2.89 and 1.94, respectively), consistent with audit costs increasing following 
inspector-identified deficiencies in internal control audits. We also find that the average fee 
increase is economically significant. As DEF_IC%i,t increases from the 25
th
 percentile (4.0%) 
to the 75
th
 percentile (27.3%), predicted audit fees increase by $63,000, equal to 
approximately 2% of mean audit fees.
26
 
Table 9 also finds that the coefficient on DEF_NOT_IC%i,t is insignificant in all three 
models. This is notable because DEF_NOT_IC%i,t captures deficiencies unrelated to internal 
controls. The lack of significance on this coefficient suggests that fees do not increase in 
response to other types of deficiencies. In addition, we find a significant positive coefficient 
on MISSTATEi,t for the full sample and the sub-sample of Big Four auditors (t-stats. = 2.77 and 
2.75), but not for the smaller sample of non-Big Four auditors. This is consistent with Big 
Four auditors charging higher audit fees to companies with lower financial reporting quality 
and with such companies being more likely to subsequently restate their accounts. 
4.9 REMEDIATION AND INTERIM FINANCIAL REPORTING  
If auditors remediate the audit deficiencies identified by the PCAOB inspectors, they 
may also be more likely to identify misstatements in interim financial reports. If so, managers 
may remediate the weakness that caused the interim misstatement, and if the remediation 
occurs before the fiscal year-end, the auditor would then issue a clean internal control 
opinion. Thus, our treatment variable (DEF_IC%i,t) may lead to a reduction in adverse 
opinions among clients who restate their interim financial statements before the year-end. 
This suggests another possible channel through which the PCAOB‟s increased inspection 
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 We also rerun the audit fee model after including ICOPi,t and ICOPi,t × DEF_IC%i,t , and find (un-tabled) that 
the interaction term is insignificant at conventional levels. This is consistent with DEF_IC%i,t triggering costly 
remediation even on engagements that do not result in the issuance of an adverse audit opinion. 
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efforts might improve the quality of internal control audits. We note, however, that this effect 
would reduce our ability to detect an increase in adverse opinions among audit firms with 
relatively high inspection deficiency rates.  
We investigate this possibility by creating an indicator variable (REMEDi,t) that 
equals one if company i both (1) restates its interim financial statements prior to the auditor‟s 
issuance of its internal control opinion in year t, and (2) does not subsequently restate its 
annual audited financial statements for year t; REMEDi,t equals zero otherwise. The first 
requirement assures that the client had a material weakness in internal controls during an 
interim period, and the second requirement is consistent with successful remediation prior to 
the fiscal year-end.
27
 We then repeat our analysis in Table 4 after including the interaction 
term, REMEDi,t × DEF_IC%i,t. The results (not tabled) find that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive but insignificant (z-stat. = 0.81).
28
 Thus, our results do not suggest 
that PCAOB inspections cause companies to remediate the material weaknesses that cause 
misstatements of their interim financial reports. We caution, however, that the absence of a 
subsequent restatement is a crude proxy for remediation, limiting the strength of the 
inferences we can draw from this analysis. 
5. Sensitivity Tests 
 As discussed in Section II of the Internet Appendix, we find that our primary results 
are robust to the following: 
1. Controlling for company fixed effects and random effects
29
; 
2. Using changes in deficiency rates instead of levels as our treatment variable; 
3. Replacing DEF_NOT_IC%i,t with a variable capturing any type of deficiency; 
                                                          
27
 Imdieke [2016] finds that 18.5% of reported remediations are subsequently revealed to have been 
unsuccessful. 
28
 The coefficient on the main effect of REMEDi,t is significantly positive, suggesting that internal control 
weaknesses associated with interim financial reporting misstatements are not fully remediated prior to year-end. 
29
 After including company fixed effects and random effects, we find that the magnitude of the coefficient on 
DEF_IC% is equal to or larger than the magnitude of the coefficients on DEF_IC% reported in Tables 4 and 7.  
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4. Measuring DEF_IC%i,t as the unscaled number of deficiencies, and using this variable 
to test the entire period for which we have inspection reports (2005-2013); 
5. Constructing the post-inspection windows using the inspection completion date 
instead of the inspection report date; 
6. Redefining DEF_NOT_IC%i,t to exclude deficiencies related to the inappropriate 
evaluation of the materiality of identified material weaknesses.  
7. Dropping clients that entered or exited the sample. 
6. Summary and conclusion  
In recent years, the PCAOB and SEC have expressed concerns about auditors failing 
to detect and report material internal control weaknesses. In an effort to improve the quality 
of internal control audits, the PCAOB focused its inspections on whether audit firms obtain 
sufficient evidence to support their internal control opinions. Our study examines whether the 
PCAOB‟s efforts were successful in improving the quality of internal control audits.  
As hypothesized, we find that PCAOB inspection reports disclosing higher rates of 
deficiencies in internal control audits are followed by an increase in auditors‟ issuance of 
adverse opinions. In addition, the reported deficiencies prompt auditors to issue more adverse 
opinions to companies that genuinely warrant them; i.e., companies with concurrent material 
misstatements. Finally, we find that inspection reports with higher deficiency rates lead to 
increased audit fees. Together, our findings suggest that PCAOB inspections motivate audit 
firms to remediate the deficiencies in their internal control audits, leading to improved quality 
during the post-inspection period, albeit at a higher cost to audit clients. 
We caution, however, that there are some caveats in interpreting our findings. One is 
that we are unable to conclude whether the observed remediation is socially optimal. The 
improvement in internal control audits is accompanied by an increase in audit fees as well as 
an increase in inspection costs, and we cannot evaluate whether the benefits justify the 
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additional costs. Another caveat is that we compare audit firms with high deficiency rates 
relative to those with low deficiency rates. However, audit firms with low deficiency rates 
may also derive remediation benefits from PCAOB inspections. Without comparisons to 
uninspected audit firms (which is not feasible, since every US public company audit firm is 
inspected), we are unable to measure the benefits of inspections to audit firms with low 
deficiency rates. Finally, it remains an open question whether the other types of deficiencies 
reported by PCAOB inspectors (primarily deficiencies in substantive testing and analytical 
procedures) also lead to subsequent improvements in audit quality. It is challenging to 
measure improvements in substantive testing and analytical procedures using archival data, 
so we leave this to future research.  
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TABLE 1 
Audit firms’ internal control reports and the deficiencies in internal control audits found by PCAOB inspectors.  
Panel A: Big Four audit firms 
 
 Adverse internal control 
reports (%) 
  
PCAOB inspection reports 
 Full Misstatements  Mean no. of audits found to Mean no. of audits Mean % of audits found to 
  40 
Year sample 
 
(1) 
sub-sample 
 
(2) 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(3) 
examined by inspectors  
 
(4) 
have  internal control 
deficiencies  
(5) 
2005 10.0% 19.9%  4.00 n.a. n.a. 
2006 7.4% 16.8%  0.75 n.a. n.a. 
2007 6.3% 13.8%  1.00 n.a. n.a. 
2008 3.8% 9.0%  0.00 n.a. n.a. 
2009 2.6% 4.9%  0.75 n.a. n.a. 
2010 1.9% 3.8%  2.50 66.75 3.78% 
2011 2.5% 5.4%  9.00 60.50 14.64% 
2012 2.8% 6.1%  12.75 54.75 23.36% 
2013 3.6% 9.0%  16.50 50.50 32.65% 
      
Panel B: Annually-inspected non-Big Four audit firms 
 
 Adverse internal control 
reports (%) 
  
PCAOB inspection reports 
 
Year 
Full 
sample 
 
(1) 
Misstatements 
sub-sample 
 
(2) 
 Mean no. of audits found to 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(3) 
Mean no. of audits 
examined by inspectors  
 
(4) 
Mean % of audits found to 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(5) 
2005 10.8% 22.1%  2.50 n.a. n.a. 
2006 7.7% 18.2%  2.00 n.a. n.a. 
2007 6.5% 13.4%  0.50 n.a. n.a. 
2008 4.1% 9.0%  0.50 n.a. n.a. 
2009 2.9% 5.5%  0.25 n.a. n.a. 
 
TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Audit firms’ internal control reports and the deficiencies in internal control audits found by PCAOB inspectors. 
 
Panel B: Annually-inspected non-Big Four audit firms (cont.) 
 
 Adverse internal control 
reports (%) 
  
PCAOB inspection reports 
 
Year 
Full 
sample 
 
(1) 
Misstatements 
sub-sample 
 
(2) 
 Mean no. of audits found to 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(3) 
Mean no. of audits 
examined by inspectors  
 
(4) 
Mean % of audits found to 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(5) 
2010 2.3% 5.8%  1.25 26.00 5.40% 
2011 2.8% 6.6%  3.50 26.00 18.53% 
2012 2.9% 6.6%  4.50 21.75 19.67% 
2013 3.7% 8.5%  7.50 20.50 31.36% 
 
Panel C: Triennially-inspected non-Big Four audit firms 
 
 Adverse internal control 
reports (%) 
  
PCAOB inspection reports 
 
Year 
Full 
sample 
 
(1) 
Misstatements 
sub-sample 
 
(2) 
 Mean no. of audits found to 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(3) 
Mean no. of audits 
examined by inspectors  
 
(4) 
Mean % of audits found to 
have internal control 
deficiencies  
(5) 
2005 14.8% 26.7%  0.44 5.36 12.63% 
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2006 16.9% 24.6%  0.10 3.25 3.26% 
2007 14.3% 24.4%  0.13 5.46 2.34% 
2008 13.1% 23.1%  0.00 4.24 0.00% 
2009 7.1% 14.3%  0.00 2.63 0.00% 
2010 8.2% 17.9%  0.02 3.69 1.42% 
2011 12.1% 14.3%  0.07 3.42 1.76% 
2012 8.2% 23.8%  0.22 3.59 6.39% 
2013 6.1% 25.0%  0.27 3.29 8.24% 
Fig. 1 
The post-inspection windows. 
 
(a) Annually inspected auditors.  
For example, inspection reports were issued to Deloitte & Touche on May 4, 2010, 
Dec 7, 2011, Nov 28, 2012, May 7, 2013, and May 6, 2014. Its four post-inspection 
windows are measured as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Triennially inspected auditors.  
For example, inspection reports were issued to Brown, Edwards and Company on 
Sept 30, 2008, Aug 3, 2011, and Feb 27, 2014. Its two post-inspection windows are 
measured as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Auditors’ internal control reports and PCAOB inspection reports. 
The sample of internal control reports comprises companies with year-ends in the period 2010-2013.  
The sample of PCAOB inspection reports comprises the post-inspection windows for this period (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
The post-inspection 
period for the report 
issued on May 4, 2010 
May 4, 2010 Dec 7, 2011 Nov 28, 2012 May 7, 2013 May 6, 2014 
The post-inspection 
period for the report 
issued on Dec 7, 2011 
The post-inspection 
period for the report 
issued on Nov 28, 2012 
The post-inspection 
period for the report 
issued on May 7, 2013 
Sept 30, 2008 Aug 3, 2011 Feb 27, 2014 
The post-inspection 
period for the report 
issued on Sept 30, 2008 
The post-inspection 
period for the report 
issued on Aug 3, 2011 
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Auditors‟ internal control reports 
  
PCAOB inspection reports 
 No. of 
reports  
 
Adverse (%) 
 No. of post-inspection 
windows (see Fig. 1)  
% of audits with internal 
control deficiencies 
8 Annually inspected auditors:      
Deloitte & Touche 2,635 1.90%  4 17.22% 
Ernst & Young 3,560 2.75%  4 21.20% 
KPMG 2,594 2.58%  4 15.83% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2,989 3.04%  4 20.18% 
BDO  388 4.38%  4 13.36% 
Crowe Horwath 156 1.92%  4 27.56% 
Grant Thornton 598 5.35%  4 24.09% 
McGladrey               138 5.07%     4 9.95% 
 13,058   32  
94 Triennially inspected auditors 875 5.03%  310 4.83% 
Total 13,933   Total 342  
 
  
 
 
TABLE 3 
Mean values of the independent variables. 
    
 Adverse internal control 
reports issued during the 
post-inspection window 
(ICOPi,t = 1) 
Clean internal control 
reports issued during the 
post-inspection window 
(ICOPi,t = 0) 
Adverse  
vs. clean 
(t-stat.) 
 
DEF_IC%i,t  0.1948 0.1683 3.98 *** 
DEF_NOT_IC%i,t  0.1289 0.1211 1.62  
ICOPi,t-1  0.2861 0.0191 34.27 *** 
MISSTATEi,t  0.2323 0.0909 9.64 *** 
RESIGNi,t  0.0367 0.0035 9.87 *** 
Ln(AF)i,t  14.1613 14.1128 0.80 
Ln(NAS)i,t  10.2511 11.0198 -3.75 *** 
SIZEi,t  12.4372 13.6843 -8.34 *** 
LOSSi,t  0.4670 0.2192 11.86 *** 
SEGMENTSi,t  4.0513 4.2556 -0.91 
FOREIGNi,t  0.3887 0.3465 1.77 * 
INVENTORYi,t  0.0826 0.0714 2.03 ** 
GROWTHi,t  0.0536 0.0733 1.30 
XTFINi,t  0.1589 0.1388 1.41 
M&Ai,t  0.1883 0.1735 0.77 
RESTRUCTUREi,t  0.3056 0.2810 1.26 
    
Obs. 409 13,524  
    
 
***, **, * denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests) 
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See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
PCAOB inspection deficiencies and auditors’ subsequent internal control 
reports. 
 
ICOPi,t = α1 DEF_IC%i,t + α2 DEF_NOT_IC%i,t + CONTROLS  
+ Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u 
  
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering on each company. 
 All auditors 
 
                     (1) 
Big Four 
Auditors 
(2) 
Non-Big Four 
Auditors 
(3) 
DEF_IC%i,t  
3.18 
(5.70) 
*** 5.03 
(4.47) 
*** 2.72 
(3.28) 
*** 
DEF_NOT_IC%i,t  
0.24 
(0.42) 
1.00 
(0.81) 
0.84 
(1.31) 
ICOPi,t-1  
2.65 
(15.87) 
*** 2.83 
(14.29) 
*** 2.14 
(7.61) 
*** 
MISSTATEi,t  
1.12 
(8.31) 
*** 1.09 
(6.97) 
*** 1.31 
(4.57) 
*** 
RESIGNi,t  
1.75 
(4.70) 
*** 2.32 
(4.03) 
*** 1.66 
(4.10) 
*** 
Ln(AF)i,t  
0.25 
(4.23) 
*** 0.27 
(3.71) 
*** 0.45 
(2.63) 
*** 
Ln(NAS)i,t  
-0.03 
(-2.52) 
** -0.04 
(-2.43) 
** -0.03 
(-1.06) 
SIZEi,t  
-0.09 
(-8.29) 
*** -0.08 
(-7.50) 
*** -0.11 
(-3.02) 
*** 
LOSSi,t  
0.86 
(7.38) 
*** 0.81 
(6.02) 
*** 1.00 
(4.40) 
*** 
SEGMENTSi,t  
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.63) 
-0.02 
(-0.72) 
FOREIGNi,t  
0.12 
(1.06) 
0.28 
(2.11) 
** -0.73 
(-2.80) 
*** 
INVENTORYi,t  
0.90 
(2.18) 
** 0.93 
(1.79) 
* 1.08 
(1.43) 
GROWTHi,t  
0.11 
(0.71) 
-0.04 
(-0.20) 
0.57 
(1.77) 
* 
XTFINi,t  
-0.05 
(-0.19) 
0.15 
(0.60) 
-1.10 
(-1.62) 
M&Ai,t  
0.17 
(1.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.81 
(2.51) 
** 
RESTRUCTUREi,t  
-0.14 
(-1.02) 
-0.14 
(-0.95) 
-0.11 
(-0.34) 
       
Obs. 13,933  11,778  2,155  
Pseudo R
2
 17.7%  17.3%  22.1%  
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TABLE 4 (cont.) 
PCAOB inspection deficiencies and auditors’ subsequent internal control 
reports. 
 
***, **, * denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively 
(two-tailed tests). 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 
Types of internal control audit deficiencies identified by PCAOB inspectors 
 
    
Panel A: Deficiencies arising from:  
1) inadequate testing of internal controls (DEF_IC_TEST%i,t) 
2) inadequate evaluation of materiality of identified weaknesses (DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t)  
 
 All 
auditors 
Annually 
inspected 
auditors 
Triennially 
inspected 
auditors 
 
Big Four 
auditors 
 
Non-Big Four 
auditors 
DEF_IC_TEST%i,t  0.1690 0.1780 0.0367 0.1794 0.1125 
DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t  0.0182 0.0194 0.0000 0.0204 0.0063 
    
Panel B: Three sub-categories of an auditor’s inadequate testing of internal controls:  
1) inadequate testing of controls relating to specific accounts (DEF_IC_TEST_AC%i,t) 
2) inadequate testing of controls relating to IT systems (DEF_IC_TEST_IT%i,t)  
3) inadequate testing of controls due to over-reliance on the work of others 
(DEF_IC_TEST_OTHERS%) 
 
 All 
auditors 
Annually 
inspected 
auditors 
Triennially 
inspected 
auditors 
 
Big Four 
auditors 
 
Non-Big Four 
auditors 
DEF_IC_TEST_AC%i,t  0.1580 0.1664 0.0324 0.1671 0.1083 
DEF_IC_TEST_IT%i,t  0.0288 0.0307 0.0000 0.0307 0.0184 
DEF_IC_TEST_OTHERS%i,t  0.0383 0.0403 0.0074 0.0396 0.0312 
    
Panel C: Regression results 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering on each company. We use the same control variables (CONTROLS) as in Table 
4 but results for the control variables are untabulated. The models are estimated for the full 
sample because DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t equals zero for all the triennially inspected auditors 
(see Panel A above). 
    
DEF_IC_TEST%i,t  2.86 
(4.88) 
***   
DEF_IC_MATERIAL%i,t  7.13 
(3.02) 
*** 6.72 
(2.41) 
**  
DEF_IC_TEST_AC%i,t   2.72 
(4.62) 
***  
DEF_IC_TEST_IT%i,t   1.89 
(0.48) 
 
DEF_IC_TEST_OTHERS%i,t   1.52 
(0.67) 
 
    
CONTROLS? YES YES  
    
Obs. 13,933  13,933   
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TABLE 5 (cont.) 
Types of internal control audit deficiencies identified by PCAOB inspectors. 
 
 
***, ** denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 
PCAOB inspection deficiencies and auditors’ subsequent internal control reports for 
companies whose financial statements are materially misstated when the auditor issues 
the internal control report. 
 
ICOPi,t = α1 DEF_IC%i,t + α2 DEF_IC%i,t ×MISSTATEi,t + α3 MISSTATEi,t + CONTROLS  
                                              + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u   
 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering on each company. We use the same control variables (CONTROLS) as in Table 
4 but results for the control variables are untabulated. 
 
 
 
All auditors 
 
Big Four auditors 
 
Non-Big Four auditors 
DEF_IC%i,t  
3.23 
(5.83) 
*** 4.97 
(4.40) 
*** 2.87 
(3.54) 
*** 
DEF_IC%i,t ×MISSTATEi,t  
-0.47 
(-0.46) 
0.37 
(0.30) 
-2.81 
(-1.40) 
MISSTATEi,t  
1.21 
(5.50) 
*** 1.01 
(3.51) 
*** 1.56 
(4.56) 
*** 
     
CONTROLS? YES YES YES  
     
α1 + α2 2.76 5.34 0.06  
Chi
2 
test of α1 + α2 6.10 ** 11.20 *** 0.00  
     
Obs. 13,933  11,778  2,155  
Pseudo R
2
 17.7%  17.3%  21.7%  
 
 
***, ** denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
Adverse internal control opinions as timely and informative indicators of the future risk 
of an accounting restatement. 
 
RESTATEi,t+1 = α1 ICOPi.t + α2 DEF_IC%i,t + α3 ICOPi.t × DEF_IC%i,t + CONTROLS  
                                              + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u   
 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering on each company. We use the same control variables (CONTROLS) as in Table 
4 but results for the control variables are untabulated.  
ICOPi,t 
1.33 
(9.37) 
*** 1.52 
(6.60) 
***  
ICOPi,t × DEF_IC%i,t  
 -0.95 
(-1.00) 
 
DEF_IC%i,t  
-0.26 
(-0.55) 
-0.16 
(-0.34) 
 
    
CONTROLS? YES YES  
    
Obs. 13,933  13,933    
Pseudo R
2
 4.8%  4.8%    
 
***, ** denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8 
PCAOB inspections and auditors’ internal control reports issued in the period 
before the inspections begin. 
 
PRE_ICOPi,t = β1 DEF_IC%i,t + CONTROLS + Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed 
effects + u   
 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering on each company. We use the same control variables 
(CONTROLS) as in Table 4 but results for the control variables are untabulated. 
    
 All auditors Big Four auditors Non-Big Four auditors 
DEF_IC%i,t  
-0.17 
(-0.29) 
-1.30 
(-1.51) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
    
CONTROLS? YES YES YES 
    
Obs. 16,154 13,475 2,679 
    
 
***, **, * denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed tests). 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 9 
PCAOB inspection results and subsequent audit fees. 
 
Ln(AF)i,t = α1 DEF_IC%i,t + α2 DEF_NOT_IC%i,t  + CONTROLS  
+ Year fixed effects + Audit firm fixed effects + u   
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering on each company.  
 All auditors  Big Four auditors Non-Big Four auditors 
DEF_IC%i,t  
0.09 
(3.13) 
*** 0.10 
(2.89) 
*** 0.09 
(1.94) 
* 
DEF_NOT_IC%i,t  
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.96) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
Ln(AF)I,t-1 
0.96 
(340.43) 
*** 0.96 
(340.22) 
*** 0.91 
(74.42) 
*** 
MISSTATEi,t  
0.02 
(2.77) 
*** 0.02 
(2.75) 
*** 0.01 
(0.63) 
RESIGNi,t  
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.17 
(1.36) 
-0.14 
(-1.35) 
SIZEi,t  
0.01 
(6.55) 
*** 0.01 
(5.88) 
*** 0.01 
(2.46) 
** 
Ln(NAS)i,t  
0.01 
(11.12) 
*** 0.01 
(10.39) 
*** 0.01 
(2.86) 
*** 
LOSSi,t  
0.01 
(0.56) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(1.21) 
SEGMENTSi,t  
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.01 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(1.01) 
FOREIGNi,t  
0.01 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(-0.48) 
0.04 
(2.33) 
** 
INVENTORYi,t  
-0.01 
(-0.67) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
GROWTHi,t  
0.11 
(8.68) 
*** 0.12 
(8.66) 
*** 0.08 
(3.38) 
*** 
XTFINi,t  
0.04 
(5.41) 
*** 0.04 
(4.70) 
*** 0.03 
(2.34) 
** 
M&Ai,t  
0.08 
(14.73) 
*** 0.08 
(13.09) 
*** 0.13 
(7.75) 
*** 
RESTRUCTUREi,t  
-0.02 
(-4.35) 
*** -0.02 
(-3.74) 
*** -0.05 
(-2.84) 
*** 
    
Obs. 13,873  11,731  2,142  
R
2
 96.3%  96.0%  90.7%  
    
***, **, * denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed tests). 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
